



When Must Means May: How the Washington State 
Supreme Court Undermined the System of Checks and 
Balances in SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire 
B. Porter Sesnon* 
“To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be 
passed by those intended to be restrained?”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SEIU2 Healthcare 775NW (SEIU) is a union that represents approx-
imately 25,000 home care workers, also known as individual providers 
(IPs).3 The IPs provide care for elderly and disabled individuals who are 
Medicaid-eligible.4 In 2001, the IPs and their patients sponsored an initi-
ative,5 I-775, to be voted on during the November 2001 general election. 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Sociology with Honors, Seattle 
University, 2007.  
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 2. SEIU stands for the Service Employees International Union. SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, 
http://www.seiu.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 3. See Agreed Statement of Facts at 1, SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774 
(Wash. 2010) (No. 82551–3) [hereinafter Agreed Statement of Facts]; About Us, SEIU HEALTHCARE 
775NW, http://www.seiu775.org/about_us/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter 
SEIU, About Us]. 
 4. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.240(3) (2010) (“‘Individual provider’ means a person, includ-
ing a personal aide, who has contracted with the department to provide personal care or respite care 
services to functionally disabled persons under the [M]edicaid personal care . . . program, or to pro-
vide respite care or residential services and support to persons with developmental disabili-
ties . . . .”). 
 5. The initiative process allows residents of Washington State to petition to place proposed 
legislation on the ballot if they are dissatisfied with the current law or feel like new laws are needed. 
The proposed legislation can also be submitted directly to the legislature for consideration at the 
regular legislative session. See WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, FILING INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA IN 
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I-775 proposed that the IPs be able to form a union for collective-
bargaining purposes.6 Voters approved this initiative by a 2-to-1 margin 
on November 6, 2001.7 Following the passage of I-775, the IPs formed a 
union and chose SEIU to be their exclusive bargaining representative. 
They named the union SEIU Healthcare 775NW after I-775.8 I-775 al-
lowed the IPs to collectively bargain with the State of Washington to 
determine their wages, hours, and working conditions.9 
In December 2008, SEIU filed an original action in the Washington 
State Supreme Court, asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus10 to 
compel Governor Christine Gregoire to revise her recently submitted 
budget proposal. SEIU wanted the Governor to include a request for 
funds necessary to implement the collective-bargaining agreement that 
the State and SEIU agreed to two months earlier.11 SEIU disputed Gov-
ernor Gregoire’s failure to include a request to fund the collective-
bargaining agreement in her proposed 2009–11 biennial budget.12 SEIU 
argued that Governor Gregoire had a mandatory13 and ministerial14 duty 
to submit the request for funding the agreement in her proposed budget.15 
The State countered by arguing that the duty was neither mandatory nor 
ministerial because the Governor has complete discretion when submit-
                                                                                                             
WASHINGTON STATE 2011–2012 6 (2011), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/In 
itiative%20and%20Referenda%20Manual.pdf. 
 6. Rebecca Cook, State to Regulate Home Caregivers, SPOKESMAN REV., Nov. 7, 2001, 
http://www.spokesmanreview.com/news-story.asp?date=110701&ID=s1050349&cat=section.region 
al; Angela Galloway, Home-Care Reform Plan, I-775, is Union-Made, SEATTLE POST–
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 9, 2001, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/42137_init10.shtml; Initiative 775 
Qualifies to Ballot, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE (Aug. 1, 2001), http://www.sos.wa.gov/office/osos_ 
news.aspx?i=Zkqx6fmRQPXp0fPROEXajg%3D%3D. 
 7. WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2001 GEN. ELECTION RESULTS REP., http://www.sos.wa.gov/ 
elections/results_report.aspx?e=21&c=&c2=&t=&t2=5&p=&p2=&y= (last visited Oct. 11, 2011); 
see also David Rolf & Kathy Coster, Op-Ed., Public Wants Home Care Strengthened, SEATTLE 
POST–INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13, 2001, http://www.seattlepi.com/opinion/50550_homeop.shtml. 
 8. SEIU, About Us, supra note 3. 
 9. § 74.39A.240(3); Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 1. 
 10. A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a public agency or governmental body to 
perform an act required by law when it has neglected or refused to do so. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1991). 
 11. See Brief of Petitioner at 2, SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 777 
(Wash. 2010) (No. 82551–3) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]; see also Curt Woodward, Home-Care 
Union Sues Gregoire, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
politics/2008571895_seiu30.html. 
 12. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 2.  
 13. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.b. 
 14. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 777 (“‘[W]here the law prescribes and defines 
the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of 
discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial.’” (quoting State v. City of Seattle, 242 P. 966, 968 
(Wash. 1926))); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.1.c. 
 15. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 2. 
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ting the proposed budget to the legislature.16 Further, the State argued 
that even if the duty were mandatory and ministerial, SEIU had not satis-
fied the statutory prerequisites because the director of financial manage-
ment had not certified the collective-bargaining agreement as financially 
feasible for the state.17 
Ultimately, the Washington State Supreme Court denied SEIU’s 
petition for a writ of mandamus on three grounds.18 First, the court held 
that the duty was not ministerial because the budgetary process requires 
the Governor’s complete discretion, making the case inappropriate for 
mandamus.19 Second, even if mandamus were appropriate, the court 
would have exercised its discretion and denied the writ because of the 
financial crisis facing the state.20 Finally, the case was nevertheless moot 
because the legislature had already passed the budget that SEIU re-
quested to be withdrawn, eliminating SEIU’s only requested relief.21 
Through this flawed reasoning, the Washington State Supreme 
Court undermined the cornerstones of the system of checks and balances 
between the branches of government: (1) the judiciary’s deference to the 
legislature on matters of policy; (2) the judiciary’s responsibility to check 
the power of the executive when the executive disregards a validly 
enacted statute; and (3) the legislature’s ability to check the power of the 
executive through enacting valid statutes.22 
This Note examines the statutory framework that allows the IPs to 
collectively bargain with the state, the factual dispute between Governor 
Gregoire and SEIU, and the legal reasoning used by the Washington 
State Supreme Court to resolve the dispute. Part II discusses the statutory 
framework for collective bargaining between SEIU and the state, and 
how an agreement is funded. Part III examines the facts underlying the 
dispute in SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire and the reasoning of the 
Washington Supreme Court in the case.23 Part IV explains the flawed 
reasoning behind the decision and discusses the future consequences of 
the decision.24 Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
                                                 
 16. See Brief of Respondent at 22–23, SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d 774 (No. 82551–3) 
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. 
 17. Id. at 22. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III. 
 19. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 777–78. 
 20. See id. at 778–79. 
 21. See id. at 779. 
 22. Id. at 784–85 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The statutory framework enacted pursuant to I-775 designates the 
governor as the public employer of the IPs and requires the governor to 
negotiate the collective-bargaining agreements with SEIU, the IPs’ rep-
resentative for the purposes of collective bargaining.25 This Part explains 
the collective-bargaining process and how the state funds collective-
bargaining agreements. 
The collective-bargaining process determines the wages, hours, 
working conditions, and grievance procedures of the IPs.26 When the two 
sides reach an agreement,27 it does not become binding on the parties 
unless the director of financial management has certified the agreement 
as financially feasible for the state.28 But if the parties reach an impasse 
during collective bargaining, they are required to submit the unresolved 
issues to arbitration.29 After the issues have been submitted for arbitra-
tion, the arbiter must consider two main factors when resolving the im-
passe.30 First, the arbiter compares the hours, wages, and working condi-
tions of similar, publicly reimbursed IPs that serve similar clients within 
the state and nationally.31 Second, the arbiter considers the state’s ability 
to pay for the compensation and benefits it might award.32 Unlike the 
directly negotiated agreement, the arbiter’s decision does not need to be 
certified by the director of financial management for it to become bind-
ing on the parties.33 
Before the governor makes a request to the legislature to fund the 
agreement, two statutory prerequisites must be satisfied.34 First, the re-
quest for funds necessary to implement the agreement must be “submit-
                                                 
 25. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.270(1) (2010). The statute also provides that the governor’s 
designee can negotiate the collective-bargaining agreements if the governor so chooses. Id. 
 26. Id. § 74.39A.270(6). 
 27. Id. § 74.39A.270(2)(c) (“The mediation and interest arbitration provisions of RCW 
41.56.430 through 41.56.470 and 41.56.480 apply . . . .”). 
 28. Id. § 74.39A.300(2)(b). 
 29. Id. § 74.39A.270(2)(c) (stating that the arbitration provisions contained in sections 
41.56.430–470 and 41.56.480 of the Washington Revised Code will apply). The specific process for 
certification of the issues for arbitration is contained in section 41.56.450. 
 30. Id. § 41.56.465(5)(a). The arbiter also has the discretion to consider four other factors. 
First, the arbiter can compare the hours, wages, and working conditions of publicly employed IPs 
serving similar clients across the state and country. Second, the arbiter can consider the state’s inter-
est in promoting a stable, long-term care workforce that can provide quality care. Third, the arbiter 
can consider the state’s interest in ensuring access to affordable, quality health care. Fourth, the 
arbiter can consider the state’s fiscal interest in reducing reliance on public welfare programs. Id. 
§ 41.56.465(5)(b). 
 31. Id. § 41.56.465(5)(a)(i). 
 32. Id. § 41.56.465(5)(a)(ii). 
 33. Id. § 74.39A.300(2)(b). 
 34. Id. § 74.39A.300(2). 
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ted to the director of financial management by October 1st prior to the 
legislative session at which the request is to be considered.”35 Second, 
the request must either be “certified by the director of financial manage-
ment as being feasible financially for the state or reflect the binding deci-
sion of an arbitration panel reached under RCW § 74.39A.270(2)(c).”36 
In any event, once the union and governor reach an agreement, it does 
not take effect unless the legislature funds it.37 
If the parties submit a valid agreement or award on time, the statute 
provides that “the governor must submit, as part of the proposed biennial 
or supplemental operating budget submitted to the legislature . . . a re-
quest for funds necessary . . . to implement the compensation and fringe 
benefits provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement  entered in-
to . . . .”38 Once the governor submits the request for funds to the legisla-
ture, the legislature must vote on whether to fund the request in its final 
budget.39 If the legislature rejects it or simply fails to act, then the agree-
ment will be reopened for renegotiation.40 But if the legislature approves 
the award, the governor still has the ability to strike it from the budget 
with the governor’s line-item veto power.41 
The governor or the legislature can also modify an agreement cur-
rently in force if the state experiences a significant revenue shortfall.42 
Before an agreement can be modified, the governor or the legislature 
must issue a proclamation stating that a current and significant revenue 
shortfall exists and then ask the union to reopen and modify the existing 
                                                 
 35. Id. § 74.39A.300(2)(a). 
 36. Id. § 74.39A.300(2)(b). 
 37. Id. § 74.39A.300(3). 
 38. Id. § 74.39A.300(1). To keep the legislature apprised of a collective-bargaining agreement 
that has been entered into, the governor is also required to periodically consult with the legislature 
regarding the appropriations necessary to implement the award and any potential legislation needed 
to fund it. Id. § 74.39A.300(5). 
 39. See id. § 74.39A.300(3). 
 40. See id. If the parties cannot come to a new agreement during the renegotiation, the collec-
tive-bargaining award from the prior budget will stay in effect. See id. § 74.39A.300(6). 
 41. See WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (defining the governor’s veto powers); Wash. State Leg. 
v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 885, 892−93 (Wash. 1997) (upholding the governor’s ability to veto budget 
provisions). 
 42. § 74.39A.300(7). This process is currently taking place. Governor Gregoire issued the 
proclamation asking for eight collective-bargaining agreements to be reopened after the most recent 
revenue forecast projected another $385 million shortfall for the budget that ran through June 2011. 
Needless to say, SEIU Healthcare 775NW is not very happy about this request because their original 
request for funding was not submitted, and the IPs are operating under the contract entered into for 
the 2007–2009 biennium. The president of the local SEIU said that “[i]nstead of balancing her budg-
et on the backs of the lowest-paid workers in the state, I think the governor should call the Legisla-
ture into a special session tomorrow,” and a union spokesman said that “[t]here isn’t much of any-
thing left to cut.” Rachel La Corte, Gov. Chris Gregoire Asks Unions to Return to Bargaining Table, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013478141_ 
unions20m.html?syndication=rss. 
594 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:589 
agreement.43 But neither the governor nor the legislature can impose un-
ilateral changes, and the union does not have to agree to change the cur-
rent agreement.44 Nonetheless, if the proclamation is issued, the parties 
are required to immediately enter into bargaining to potentially modify 
the agreement.45 
III. GOVERNOR GREGOIRE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE REQUEST 
FOR FUNDING IN THE PROPOSED BUDGET; SEIU PETITIONS FOR A 
WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
Governor Gregoire did not include a request to fund the collective-
bargaining agreement in her proposed biennial budget,46 which prompted 
SEIU to file a petition for a writ of mandamus.47 This Part discusses the 
collective-bargaining agreement reached between SEIU and Governor 
Gregoire, the Governor’s refusal to include the award in her proposed 
2009–2011 budget, and the reasoning behind the Washington State Su-
preme Court’s refusal to grant SEIU’s petition for a writ of mandamus. 
A. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement Between SEIU 
and Governor Gregoire 
SEIU and the Labor Relations Office48 commenced the collective- 
bargaining process for the 2009–2011 labor agreement on April 4, 
2008.49 During the initial bargaining process, the parties reached a tenta-
tive agreement on a few issues; however, the parties reached an impasse 
on several important issues, including wage and fringe-benefit provi-
sions.50 The parties decided to certify the remaining issues for arbitration 
in order to complete the collective-bargaining process, which began in 
August 2008 and ended in early September 2008.51 
During the arbitration hearings, the state produced substantial evi-
dence about its rapidly deteriorating financial condition and its likely 
inability to pay any increases in wages and fringe benefits.52 Wolfgang 
Opitz, the deputy director of the Office of Financial Management, testi-
                                                 
 43. § 74.39A.300(7). 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 5. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Governor Gregoire designated the Labor Relations Office, a division of the State Office of 
Financial Management, to handle the collective bargaining with SEIU Healthcare 775NW. Id. at 1–
2. 
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2–3. 
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fied that the estimated shortfall for the 2009–2011 biennial budget was 
projected to be $2.7 billion.53 Further, he expected the budget shortfall to 
grow in the weeks and months ahead, as the country was in the middle of 
a historic economic crisis.54 
While taking into account the state’s financial arguments, the arbi-
ter ultimately awarded SEIU wage increases of 2.4% and 2.0% to take 
effect in July 2009 and July 2010, respectively.55 The total cost of the 
award to the state, minus matching federal Medicaid funds, would have 
been $72.5 million for the 2009–2011 budget.56 The arbiter explained 
that “the award is not a rich one” because of his overriding concern with 
“the State’s ability to pay for any increased costs” due to its rapidly dete-
riorating financial condition.57 Further, he noted that “it would not be 
professionally responsible for the Arbitrator to be anything other than 
extremely conservative with regard to the expenditure of [the State’s] 
funds.”58 
SEIU submitted the request for funding, along with the arbitration 
decision itself, to the director of financial management by the statutory 
deadline of October 1st.59 After submitting the request for funding, 
SEIU’s members approved the 2009–2011 labor contract.60 
B. Governor Gregoire Does Not Include the Award 
in the Proposed Budget 
Governor Gregoire submitted her proposed 2009–2011 budget to 
the legislature on December 18, 2008. The proposed budget, however, 
did not contain any funding for the arbitration award for SEIU.61 Be-
tween the time of the arbitration decision and the proposed budget, the 
Economic and Revenue Forecasting Council released its quarterly report 
in November 2008.62 The report stated that the already precarious eco-
                                                 
 53. Id. at 45 Ex. 4. 
 54. Id. at 46 Ex. 4. 
 55. Id. at 318–19 Ex. 10. 
 56. Brief of Respondent, supra note 16, at 12. 
 57. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 304 Ex. 10. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 3–4. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Id. at 5 (“The Governor’s budget document does not include a request for funding to im-
plement the compensation and fringe benefit increases decided by Arbitrator Williams [the arbiter], 
and does not include a request for funding to implement any compensation or money contributions 
that were agreed to by the parties and not subject to interest arbitration.”). 
 62. The Washington State Economic and Revenue Forecasting Council is a state agency that 
“promote[s] state government financial stability by producing an accurate forecast of economic 
activity and General Fund revenue for the legislature and the governor to be used as the basis of the 
state budget.” About Us, WASH. STATE ECON. & REVENUE FORECAST COUNCIL, http://www.erfc. 
wa.gov/about/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2010). 
596 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:589 
nomic conditions of the state had “deteriorated sharply,” and it estimated 
an even greater budget shortfall than the State predicted during the arbi-
tration proceeding.63 
On December 17, 2008, the director of the Office of Financial 
Management advised Governor Gregoire to exclude thirteen collective-
bargaining agreements and arbitration awards between the State and var-
ious unions, including SEIU, from her proposed budget.64 The director 
suggested that the Governor not include the awards in her proposed 
budget because they were not financially feasible for the state due to the 
projected and dramatic revenue shortfall,65 and because the governor is 
required by state law to propose a balanced budget to the legislature.66 
The following day, on December 18, the Office of Financial Man-
agement informed SEIU that the request for funds was not financially 
feasible and would be excluded from Governor Gregoire’s proposed 
budget.67 On that same day, Governor Gregoire submitted her 2009–2011 
proposed biennial budget without the funding request for SEIU’s arbitra-
tion award.68 
C. SEIU Petitions for a Writ of Mandamus 
On December 29, 2008, just eleven days after Governor Gregoire 
submitted her proposed budget, SEIU filed an original action in the 
Washington State Supreme Court requesting a writ of mandamus.69 The 
petition for mandamus asked the court to compel Governor Gregoire to 
withdraw her budget proposal and submit a revised budget that would 
include a funding request for the arbitration award.70 After hearing oral 
                                                 
 63. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 406 Ex. 12 (“The forecast for the 2009–11 
biennium is $30.1 billion, which is $1.4 billion lower than expected in the September forecast.”). 
 64. Id. at 4–5, 530 Ex. 14. 
 65. Id. 
 66. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.030(2) (2010) (“The total of beginning undesignated fund 
balance and estimated revenues less working capital and other reserves shall equal or exceed the 
total of proposed applicable expenditures.”). Contrary to popular belief, there is no constitutional 
requirement that the state budget be balanced. See Andrew Garber, State Isn’t Required To Balance 
Budget, but it’s Still the Goal, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/politics/2008480910_budget08m.html. 
 67. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 535 Ex. 15. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 776−77 (Wash. 2010). The Washing-
ton State Supreme Court has nonexclusive and discretionary jurisdiction to issue a writ. See Brown 
v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (Wash. 2009). Mandamus is appropriate for determining “‘the constitu-
tionality of a statute and matters relating to the expenditure of public funds.’” Id. (quoting State ex 
rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 982 P.2d 611, 613 (Wash. 1999)). One of the primary concerns when direct-
ing the writ at a coequal branch of government is to “‘not infringe upon the historical and constitu-
tional rights of that branch.’” Id. (quoting Walker v. Munro, 879 P.2d 920, 924 (Wash. 1994)). 
 70. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 168 229 P.3d at 776–77. 
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argument on March 10, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court waited 
thirteen months to issue its decision in SEIU Healthcare 775NW.71 In a 
5–4 opinion written by Justice James M. Johnson, the court denied the 
writ of mandamus for three reasons: a lack of ministerial duty, a need to 
exercise judicial restraint, and concerns over justiciability.72 This section 
examines the three reasons for the court’s denial of SEIU’s petition for 
mandamus. 
Initially, the court had to determine whether the duty in question 
was appropriate for mandamus.73 Because mandamus is appropriate only 
for a ministerial act, the court began with the threshold question of 
whether submitting the request for funding to the legislature was minis-
terial in nature.74 An act is ministerial if it involves no discretion on the 
part of the public official.75 The court, however, held that the decision to 
exclude SEIU’s arbitration award from the budget was not a ministerial 
act because the statute that required the request did not contain a funding 
source to implement it.76 Thus, the decision to exclude the award neces-
sarily involved the governor’s discretion in determining how to fund the 
award.77 Because the state had to propose a balanced budget, and because 
the state itself was in a precarious financial situation, the court reasoned 
that the governor would have to remove other items from the budget to 
accommodate the request.78 Such a removal would necessarily require 
the governor to exercise discretion in making cuts to the proposed budg-
et.79 In sum, the court concluded that 
[i]t is difficult to imagine an act more essentially a policy decision 
for the governor than the submission . . . of a budget during an eco-
                                                 
 71. While thirteen months is generally a standard amount of time between oral argument and a 
decision, SEIU was seeking immediate relief by having the Governor submit a revised budget. Id. at 
791 (Sanders, J., concurring in dissent) (“This case deserved swift action to protect the rights of 
these workers and their union. I have signed the dissent but would have preferred to initially decide 
this case by order with opinion to follow.”). The court most likely delayed to avoid the case on justi-
ciability grounds. Id. at 781 n.1 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority says this case may be 
moot but proceeds to the merits anyway.”). 
 72. See id. at 780. 
 73. See id. at 777 (“[W]e have placed strict limits on the circumstances under which we will 
issue the writ [of mandamus] to public officers and held that ‘mandamus may not be used to compel 
the performance of acts or duties which involve discretion on the part of a public official.’” (quoting 
Walker, 879 P.2d at 925)). 
 74. Id. at 777. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 777–78. 
 77. Id. at 778. 
 78. Id. at 777–78. 
 79. Id. at 778. In a footnote, the court sua sponte raised the issue that the governor could pro-
pose a new tax to fund the labor agreement to avoid future issues. But the court, in dicta, stated such 
action would also involve discretion, which is “a requirement similarly at odds with the principles of 
mandamus.” Id.  
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nomic downturn. The creation and submission of a budget proposal 
is clearly one of those discretionary acts that are “in their nature po-
litical, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the 
executive . . . .”80 
The majority also pointed out that any discussion about whether there 
was a mandatory duty to submit a request to fund the agreement “would 
be purely academic,” since the court already held that the act was not 
ministerial.81 
Even if mandamus was proper, the court said it would “exercise 
judicial discretion” because of “[t]he recent severe economic difficulties 
faced by our state present circumstances dictating such judicial re-
straint.”82 Because of the high costs to public resources and the likely 
negative effects to social programs if mandamus was issued, the majority 
noted that “[e]quity . . . strongly counsels against issuing the writ even 
were mandamus an appropriate remedy.”83 During oral argument, Justice 
James M. Johnson was very concerned at the prospect of Governor Gre-
goire being forced to cut $100 million from somewhere else in the budg-
et to accommodate SEIU’s request.84 Because Governor Gregoire is re-
quired by statute to propose a balanced budget, the court felt it was best 
to also refrain from issuing the writ due to the precarious financial condi-
tion of the state.85 
Finally, at the very end of the majority opinion, the court held that 
the case was nevertheless moot since the budget in question had been 
submitted and approved over a year prior to the decision.86 The majority 
wanted to “refrain from requiring the performance of useless or vain 
acts” because compliance with the writ would have zero operative effect 
on the already submitted budget.87 Therefore, the court could “no longer 
provide effective relief” regarding SEIU’s request to have the budget 
recalled.88 The majority further felt it was improper to grant any relief on 
                                                 
 80. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). 
 81. Id. at 778 n.8. 
 82. Id. at 778. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Oral Argument at 15:02, SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d 774 (No. 82551–3) [hereinaf-
ter Oral Argument], available at http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2009030016D& 
TYPE=V&CFID=1428461&CFTOKEN=45615245&bhcp=1. 
 85. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.030(2) (2010) (“The total of beginning undesignated fund 
balance and estimated revenues less working capital and other reserves shall equal or exceed the 
total of proposed applicable expenditures.”); SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 778–79. 
 86. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 779–80. 
 87. Id. at 779 (quoting Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov’t v. Wash. State Boundary Rev. 
Bd., 903 P.2d 953, 956 (Wash. 1995)). 
 88. Id.  
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its own accord because SEIU did not request any additional or alternative 
relief in its writ.89 
IV. THE COURT UNDERMINES THE CORNERSTONES OF CHECKS 
AND BALANCES BETWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES 
OF GOVERNMENT 
Courts have the important duty of keeping the executive and legis-
lative branches from exceeding their constitutional authority.90 While the 
Washington State Constitution does not have an express separation of 
powers clause, the division of government into separate branches has 
presumed to give rise to one.91 Evolving alongside the separation of 
powers doctrine was the concept of checks and balances.92 This concept 
gives the judiciary the power to say what the law is, even if it restrains 
the power or activities of another branch of government.93 
By denying SEIU’s petition for a writ of mandamus, the Washing-
ton State Supreme Court dramatically undermined the cornerstone of the 
balance of powers between the branches of government in three ways. 
First, by construing the duty prescribed as not ministerial, the court failed 
to give proper deference to a validly executed statute enacted by the leg-
islature.94 Second, by allowing Governor Gregoire to completely disre-
gard a statutorily mandated budget inclusion, the court failed to provide a 
check on the power of the governor.95 Third, under the guise of judicial 
restraint, the court exceeded its authority by not issuing the writ due to 
the financial crisis faced by the state, even if the duty was ministerial.96 
This Part examines the three errors in detail. 
                                                 
 89. Id. at 779–80 (“Without a request in the petition for a specific writ . . . we will not, on our 
own, craft such a remedy . . . .” (quoting Walker v. Munro, 879 P.2d 920, 924 (Wash. 1994))). 
 90. See id. at 781 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (Wash. 2009) 
(“The doctrine [separation of powers] serves mainly to ensure that the fundamental functions of each 
branch remain inviolate.” (quoting Carrick v. Locke, 882 P.2d 173, 176−77 (Wash. 1994))). 
 91. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. III, §2; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 
SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 784–85 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); Brown, 206 P.3d at 316 
(discussing the purpose of separation of powers); Carrick, 882 P.2d at 176–77 (same); In re Salary 
of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 168−70 (Wash. 1976) (outlining the development of the federal sepa-
ration of powers doctrine). 
 92. See In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 168–70 (outlining the evolution of checks and 
balances at the federal level and applying the outline to Washington State). 
 93. Id. at 168. 
 94. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 777–78. 
 95. Id. at 777 n.6. 
 96. Id. at 778. 
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A. The Court Fails to Give Proper Deference to the Legislature 
The statute enacted pursuant to I-775 stated that the governor “must 
submit” a request for funds necessary to implement the collective-
bargaining agreement  with SEIU in the proposed budget.97 But the Gov-
ernor did not request the funds necessary, and the court’s decision in 
SEIU Healthcare 775NW left the legislature powerless to force her to do 
so in the future.98 As a result, the court failed to give proper deference to 
a duly enacted statute by the legislature for two reasons. First, the statute 
imposed on the governor a mandatory and ministerial duty to include 
funding requests for collective-bargaining agreements in the proposed 
budget.99 Second, the decision leaves the legislature with no power to 
force the governor to include such items in future proposed budgets.100 
1. By Its Plain Meaning, the Statute Prescribes a Mandatory 
and Ministerial Duty 
By its plain meaning, the statutory phrase “must submit”101 created 
a mandatory and ministerial duty for the governor to submit the request 
for funds, as long as the two prerequisites in the statute were satisfied.102 
The court first erred by not considering whether a mandatory duty ex-
isted before it determined that the duty was not ministerial.103 By its own 
admission, the court stated that if a mandatory duty existed, then there 
must be a further determination of whether that duty is also ministerial.104 
Thus, before a duty can be deemed ministerial, it must first be deemed 
mandatory.105 And if that statement is to be accepted—as it was by the 
                                                 
 97. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.300(1) (2010). 
 98. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 5. 
 99. See § 43.88.060 (The governor must submit proposed budget no later than December 20th 
of the year preceding the year that it will be considered.); SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 780 
(Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (“In this state, the legislature and the governor each has powers and re-
sponsibilities with respect to the budget, and neither alone has unlimited discretion as to what must 
be, as opposed to may be, included.”). 
 100. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 787 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority 
opinion means no less than that any governor may flout any law regarding any mandatory budget 
requirement and absolutely nothing can be done about it.”). 
 101. § 74.39A.300(1). 
 102. Id. § 74.39A.300(2). 
 103. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 778 n.8, which states the following: 
Because we hold that the duty identified by the petitioner is not ministerial, we need not 
reach a decision as to whether it is mandatory. To clarify, even if the duty is mandatory 
as the petitioner contends, its nonministerial nature precludes the application of manda-
mus, and any inquiry into the degree to which RCW 74.39A.300 obligates the governor 
to include funding for compensation and fringe benefits in her proposed biennial budget 
document would be purely academic. 
 104. Id. at 777 (“‘Where we find a mandatory duty, we must further determine whether that 
duty is ministerial . . . .’” (quoting Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 320 (Wash. 2009))). 
 105. Id. 
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majority—the court should not have reached the question of whether the 
duty was ministerial until it had first determined whether the duty was 
mandatory.106 The court, therefore, should have first determined whether 
the statute created a mandatory duty, which would have been easily de-
termined if the court considered whether the two statutory prerequisites 
were satisfied. 
a. The Two Statutory Prerequisites are Satisfied 
The proposed request for funding SEIU’s arbitration award satisfied 
the two statutory prerequisites.107 The first prerequisite requires that the 
request for funds be submitted to the director of the Office of Financial 
Management by October 1st.108 The second prerequisite requires that the 
request either be certified as financially feasible by the director of the 
Office of Financial Management or that it reflect a binding arbitration 
decision between the parties.109 
Both sides agreed that the first statutory prerequisite was met be-
cause the request for funding was received by the director of the Office 
of Financial Management by the October 1st deadline.110 While both 
sides agreed that the arbitration award was not certified as financially 
feasible by the director of the Office of Financial Management, the ques-
tion of whether the arbitration decision was binding between SEIU and 
the State was hotly contested.111 The majority, however, did not even 
reach the question of whether the arbitration decision was binding be-
cause it prematurely determined that the duty was not ministerial.112 Had 
the court examined the issue, it would have found that the arbitration 
award was binding and thus satisfied the second statutory prerequisite.113 
In its brief, the State argued that the arbitration award was not bind-
ing on Governor Gregoire because the legislature had not approved fund-
ing for the award.114 The State relied on section 74.39A.270(2) of the 
Washington Revised Code, which states, 
                                                 
 106. Id. 
 107. § 74.39A.300(2). 
 108. See id. § 74.39A.300(2)(a). 
 109. Id. § 74.39A.300(2)(b). 
 110. Id. § 74.39A.300(2)(a); Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 111. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 3–4; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 17–
21; Brief of Respondent, supra note 16, at 23–38. 
 112. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 775−76 (Wash. 2010) (no dis-
cussion of whether the statutory requirements were satisfied). 
 113. See id. at 786–90 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 114. Brief of Respondent, supra note 16, at 23–38; see also SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 
P.3d at 786−87 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
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The mediation and interest arbitration provisions of RCW 41.56.430 
through 41.56.470 and 41.56.480 apply, except that: . . . if the legis-
lature does not approve the request for funds necessary to imple-
ment the compensation and fringe benefit provisions of the arbi-
trated collective bargaining agreement, is not binding on . . . the 
state.115 
If the court had reached this issue, its analysis would have begun with 
basic statutory interpretation.116 The first step of the statutory interpreta-
tion analysis is to look at the statute’s plain meaning, as well as “the con-
text of the statute in which the provision is found . . . and the statutory 
scheme as a whole.”117 
The context in which the arbitration and mediation statutes appear 
highlights the first flaw in the State’s argument that the arbitration award 
was not binding on Governor Gregoire. Section 74.39A.270(2) of the 
Washington Revised Code unambiguously states, as quoted above, that 
the mediation and interest arbitration statutes found in the other sections 
of the code apply.118 And as sections 41.56.450 and 41.56.480 of the 
Code explain, an arbitration decision is binding only on the parties to that 
specific arbitration.119 In this case, the parties to the arbitration were 
SEIU and the Labor Relations Office—the governor’s designee for pur-
poses of collective bargaining.120 The governor is party to any agreement 
reached because, by law, the governor is the employer of record.121 Thus, 
the governor is bound to any agreement reached between a designee and 
SEIU.122 Being binding on the governor does not require that the award 
be funded by the legislature; rather, as a contractual matter, only the par-
ties are bound to their specific agreement.123 Therefore, the State’s argu-
                                                 
 115. § 74.39A.270(2). 
 116. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 787 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 117. See Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 243 P.3d 1283, 1287−88 (Wash. 2010) 
(quoting State v. Engel, 210 P.3d 1007, 1009−10 (Wash. 2009)). 
 118. § 74.39A.270(2). 
 119. See id. § 41.56.450 (“[The] determination [of the arbitration panel] shall be final and 
binding upon both parties.”); id. § 41.56.480 (“A decision of the arbitration panel shall be final and 
binding on the parties, and may be enforced at the insistence of either party.”). 
 120. Id. § 74.39A.270(1) (“[T]he governor is the public employer . . . of individual providers, 
who, solely for the purposes of collective bargaining, are public employees.”). 
 121. Id. (“[T]he public employer shall be represented for bargaining purposes by the governor 
or the governor’s designee . . . .”). 
 122. See id. § 41.56.480 (“A decision of the arbitration panel shall be final and binding on the 
parties, and may be enforced at the insistence of either party.”); id. § 41.56.450 (“[The] determina-
tion [of the arbitration panel] shall be final and binding upon both parties.”). 
 123. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 781 (Wash. 2010) (Madsen, 
C.J., dissenting), which states the following: 
Finally, an important fact mentioned nowhere in the majority is that the governor was a 
party to the collective bargaining agreement at the heart of this case, with the Washington 
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ment that the arbitration agreement between the Labor Relations Office 
and SEIU was not binding on the Governor was without merit.124 
The statutory framework as a whole highlights the second flaw of 
the State’s argument.125 The statutes provide that the governor does not 
have a duty to request the funds until the statutory prerequisites are 
met.126 If the prerequisites are met, the agreement becomes binding as to 
the governor and SEIU, but it is not binding on the state until submitted 
and approved by the legislature.127 As a result, the statutory framework 
necessarily requires that the governor’s request for funding be made at a 
time when the arbitration decision is not binding on the legislature or the 
state.128 If the State’s argument is to be believed, the duty to submit the 
request for funds does not arise until the legislature has already approved 
the request.129 But if the legislature has approved the request, there is 
absolutely no reason for the governor to submit the request at all.130 Iron-
ically, Justice James M. Johnson, the author of the majority opinion re-
fusing to grant mandamus, posed this very concern to the State during 
oral argument when he pointed out that the State’s argument was circular 
and then asked when, if ever, an arbitration decision would be binding on 
the state.131 
Given the State’s extremely strained reading of when an arbitration 
award becomes binding,132 if the court reached this issue, it would have 
likely found that the arbitration award was submitted by the October 1st 
deadline and was binding on Governor Gregoire, satisfying the two statu-
tory prerequisites.133 
                                                                                                             
State Labor Relations Office (LRO) acting on her behalf. It was her contract, and she 
should not have been allowed to repudiate it in contravention of state law. 
 124. Brief of Respondent, supra note 16, at 23–38; see also SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 
P.3d at 786−87 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 125. See §§ 74.39A.270, 300. 
 126. Id. § 74.39A.300. 
 127. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 787–88 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 34:45. 
 132. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 787–88 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting), which states 
the following: 
[R]ead as the state urges . . . the duty to submit a request to fund arbitrated contracts to 
the legislature does not arise until the legislature has already approved and funded those 
very contracts. But once the legislature has determined to fund an arbitrated contract, 
there would be no reason for the governor to include a request for such funding. 
See also Tingey v. Haisch, 152 P.3d 1020, 1025−26 (Wash. 2007) (holding that courts should avoid 
reading statutes in a way that brings about unlikely or absurd results because it will not be presumed 
that the legislature intended absurd results); Brief of Respondent, supra note 16, at 23–31. 
 133. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 786−87 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
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b. The Statute Creates a Mandatory Duty 
Once the two prerequisites were met, the phrase “must submit”134 
created a mandatory duty for the Governor to submit the funding request 
in the proposed budget because the phrase is unambiguous and, by its 
plain meaning, creates a mandatory duty. 
When interpreting a statute, the Washington State Supreme Court 
has consistently said that if a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court 
is to give effect to that plain meaning as the legislature’s expression of 
intent.135 A statute’s meaning is determined by looking at the ordinary 
meaning of the language at issue, and if there is no ambiguity, the legis-
lature is presumed to have meant exactly what it said.136 
The court, however, did not even analyze the statute because it first 
determined that the duty was not ministerial.137 If the court had analyzed 
the statute and followed the proper analysis as required by its own 
precedent, the analysis would have left little doubt that the phrase “must 
submit” created a mandatory duty. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary de-
fines “must” as “be commanded” or “be obliged to.”138 It defines “sub-
mit” as “to permit oneself to be subjected to something” or “to defer to or 
consent to abide by the will of another.”139 Taken together, the statute’s 
plain meaning—and the legislature’s intent—is to command or oblige 
the governor to defer to the statute’s requirement that a request for funds 
necessary to implement the collective-bargaining agreement be included 
in the proposed budget.140 
Furthermore, other courts in Washington have consistently inter-
preted similar statutory language as creating a mandatory duty.141 In 
Graham Thrift Group v. Pierce County, a Washington appellate court 
held that a statute stating that the appellant “must file written notice” was 
a mandatory statutory requirement because the language was plain on its 
face, and the court could not possibly interpret the language any other 
                                                 
 134. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.300(1) (2010). 
 135. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 786−87 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); State v. Mit-
chell, 237 P.3d 282, 284−85 (Wash. 2010); Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 243 P.3d 1283, 
1287−88 (Wash. 2010); Tingey, 152 P.3d at 1025–26. 
 136. Geschwind v. Flanagan, 854 P.2d 1061, 1065−66 (Wash. 1993). 
 137. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 778 n.8. 
 138. MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 819 (11th ed. 2007). 
 139. Id. at 1244. 
 140. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 12–18. 
 141. See Graham Thrift Grp. Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., Country Park, Inc., 877 P.2d 228, 230 
(Wash. 1994) (“The Code uses the terms ‘must file written notice . . . and the appeal fee within ten 
(10) working days,’ indicating that the filing fee is a mandatory, statutory requirement. We cannot 
rewrite or modify the language of the statute under the guise of statutory interpretation or construc-
tion.” (quoting State v. McAlpin, 740 P.2d 824, 827 (Wash. 1987))). 
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way without rewriting the statute.142 Moreover, courts have generally 
considered “must” and “shall” as synonyms,143 and have consistently 
interpreted “shall” to create a mandatory duty.144 Therefore, by its plain 
language and consistent interpretation by courts, the phrase “must sub-
mit” created a mandatory duty for the Governor to submit the request for 
funding the arbitration award in her proposed budget. 
In addition, Governor Gregoire, by her own actions, has interpreted 
the word “must” as creating a mandatory duty in the very statute at issue 
in this case. In her prior proposed budgets, the Governor, as required by 
the statute, has submitted a request to fund the past two collective-
bargaining agreements with SEIU.145 When negotiating the labor agree-
ment for the 2005–2007 biennial budget, the parties reached an impasse 
and entered arbitration.146 After the arbitration award was given, newly 
elected Governor Gregoire submitted her first proposed budget, which 
included a request for funding a prior agreement between SEIU and the 
state with the following explanation: “The Governor must include the 
costs to meet the agreement terms and the cost of implementation of the 
agreement in the Governor’s budget . . . . Funding is needed based on the 
interest arbitration award as approved by the Legislature.”147 The parties 
again went through arbitration for the 2007–2009 biennial budget, and 
the agreement was fully implemented by the legislature.148 Governor 
                                                 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Buell v. City of Toppenish, 24 P.2d 431, 431 (Wash. 1933). 
 144. See State v. Mollichi, 936 P.2d 408, 411−12 (Wash. 1997); Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 
911 P.2d 389, 392 (Wash. 1996); State v. Krall, 881 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Wash. 1994); Erection Co. v. 
Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 852 P.2d 288, 289−93 (Wash. 1993); State v. Bartholomew, 710 P.2d 196, 
198−99 (Wash. 1985); Crown Cascade, Inc. v. O’Neal, 668 P.2d 585, 587−89 (Wash. 1983); State v. 
Huntzinger, 594 P.2d 917, 919−20 (Wash. 1979); Spokane Cnty. ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover, 97 P.2d 
628, 631−32 (Wash. 1940) (“As a general rule, the word ‘shall,’ when used in a statute, is imperative 
and operates to impose a duty which may be enforced.”). “Shall” has also been interpreted as manda-
tory by Governor Gregoire with regard to statutorily prescribed across-the-board reductions in state 
spending following a revenue shortfall. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.110(7) (2010) (“[T]he gover-
nor shall make across-the-board reductions in allotments for that particular fund or account so as to 
prevent a cash deficit . . . .”); OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, EXEC. ORDER NO. 10–04: ORDERING 
EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS IN ALLOTMENTS OF STATE GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATIONS (2010), 
available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/execorders/eo_10-04.pdf; Rachel La Corte, Gregoire 
Orders State Budget Cuts, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
localnews/2012889491_budgetcuts14.html?syndication=rss. 
 145. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 1. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See 2005 WASHINGTON STATE BUDGET 95–96 [hereinafter 2005 BUDGET], available at 
http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2005govop.pdf; Ralph Thomas, What Governor Gregoire 
Said-and Did, SEATTLE TIMES, May 1, 2005, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/200 
2259098_gregoire01m.html. 
 148. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 1; see also 2007–2009 WASHINGTON STATE 
BIENNIAL BUDGET 154 [hereinafter 2007−2009 BIENNIAL BUDGET], available at http://leap. 
leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2007lbn.pdf. 
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Gregoire’s words and actions show that, prior to the 2009–2011 pro-
posed biennial budget, she considered the duty to submit the request for 
funding as mandatory.149 
c. The Duty to Submit the Request for Funding is Ministerial 
In addition to creating a mandatory duty, the submission of the re-
quested funds was also ministerial because it left nothing to the discre-
tion or judgment of Governor Gregoire.150 For a duty to be considered 
ministerial, the statute must define the duty “to be performed with such 
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or 
judgment.”151 
The statute at issue here did just that.152 The duty to be performed is 
to “submit . . . a request for funds necessary to . . . implement 
the . . . collective-bargaining agreements entered into” as part of the gov-
ernor’s proposed budget.153 The amount of funding necessary to imple-
ment the agreement had already been determined through the prior col-
lective-bargaining process.154 Therefore, when the Governor made the 
request, the dollar amount required to fund the agreement had already 
been determined, which left nothing to her discretion or judgment be-
cause it was akin to the forwarding of information.155 Yet, the majority 
still held that the inclusion of the award in the budget required the gover-
nor’s discretion because there was no funding source for the arbitration 
award specified in the statute, and the governor had to remove the award 
in order to propose a balanced budget.156 
While that argument does have the appeal of simplicity, it does not 
hold up upon further examination. The majority did not explain why the 
Governor was allowed to disregard a statute that was duly enacted with-
                                                 
 149. 2007–2009 BIENNIAL BUDGET, supra note 148, at 154; 2005 BUDGET, supra note 147, at 
95–96; Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3, at 1. 
 150. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 777 (Wash. 2010) (“It follows 
that even a mandatory duty is not subject to mandamus unless it is also ministerial, or nondiscretio-
nary, in nature . . . .”); accord Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 320 (Wash. 2009) (“Where we find a 
mandatory duty, we must further determine whether that duty is ministerial or discretionary in na-
ture.”) (emphasis added); see also R. E. Heinselman, Annotation, Mandamus to Governor, 105 
A.L.R. 1124, 1128 (1936) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that, because a duty imposed is manda-
tory, it is also ministerial.”). 
 151. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 777 (quoting State v. City of Seattle, 242 P. 966, 
968 (Wash. 1926)). 
 152. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.300(1) (2010). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See 2005–2007 WASHINGTON STATE BIENNIAL BUDGET 95–96 (indicating that the 
amount requested is merely the amount awarded through arbitration), available at http://leap.leg. 
wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2005govop.pdf. 
 156. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 777–78. 
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out holding that the statute was an unconstitutional usurpation of the 
governor’s powers over the budgetary process.157 The Washington State 
Constitution does not contain an express separation of powers clause; 
however, it has been presumed through the state’s history that one ex-
ists.158 It is generally understood that the legislative branch has control 
over appropriations, and the executive branch has ability to veto159 and 
propose the state budget.160 Yet, some overlap does exist in the form of 
checks and balances between the branches.161 Even though it alluded to 
the unconstitutionality of the statute in its brief, when asked at oral ar-
gument if it wanted the court to find the statute unconstitutional, the 
State said, “No.”162 More importantly, because the majority did not hold 
that the statute was an unconstitutional usurpation of the governor’s 
powers or that the duty prescribed was mandatory and ministerial, it 
failed to give proper deference to the legislature’s duly enacted statute by 
allowing Governor Gregoire to completely disregard the duty pre-
scribed.163 
B. The Court Fails to Check the Power of the Governor 
The court gave Governor Gregoire, and any future governor, the 
ability to completely disregard any statutorily mandated budget inclu-
sions.164 Implicitly assumed by the majority was the fact that granting 
SEIU’s petition for mandamus would have forced the request to actually 
be funded by the legislature.165 As a result, the court opened the door to 
potential abuse by future governors, which the following hypothetical 
demonstrates is a real possibility.166 
                                                 
 157. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine the constitutionality of this statutory 
scheme; however, there is some debate as to whether the statutorily mandated budgetary inclusions 
are constitutional. See generally Christopher D. Abbott, Stealing the Public Purse: Why Washing-
ton’s Collective Bargaining Law for State Employees Violates the State Constitution, 81 WASH. L. 
REV. 159 (2006) (arguing that the collective bargaining statutory scheme for public employees is an 
unconstitutional usurpation of the governor’s powers of the budget). 
 158. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 
SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 783–84 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 
310, 316 (Wash. 2009). 
 159. See WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12; Wash. State Leg. v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 885, 896−97 
(Wash. 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of the governor’s ability to use a line-item veto). 
 160. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 784–85 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 161. See id.; Brown, 206 P.3d at 316–17. 
 162. Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 47:40. 
 163. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 777–80. 
 164. See id. at 777–79, 780. 
 165. See id. at 781 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (“This does not mean, contrary to the impression 
that the majority leaves, that the request to fund an arbitrator’s award must or will be funded. There 
is no statutory requirement that the legislature has to approve the request.”). 
 166. See id. 
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Suppose that the IPs, represented by SEIU, endorse Candidate A in-
stead of Candidate B during the next gubernatorial election. Since most 
unions are politically involved, especially SEIU,167 the union and its 
members support Candidate A’s campaign with money, canvassing, rally 
attendance, and get-out-the-vote efforts. While not every union member 
will vote for Candidate A, most union members will support the candi-
date their union endorses.168 
But despite all the efforts of SEIU and its members, Candidate B 
wins the election. Given general political realities, Candidate B might 
hold a grudge against the union for its opposition and for giving money, 
time, and energy to support Candidate A. When it comes time to prepare 
the budget, and the unions submit the request for funding of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement (assuming it satisfies the statutory require-
ments), Governor B can now simply exclude the request from the pro-
posed budget, leaving little hope that the legislature will fund the agree-
ment.169 
While this case could be held to its specific set of facts due to the 
unforeseen and dramatic revenue shortfall facing the state, the majority’s 
broad holding vested absolute discretion in the governor when proposing 
                                                 
 167. See Fred Lucas, SEIU PAC Spent $27 Million Supporting Obama’s Election, FEC Filing 
Says, CNS NEWS (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/seiu-pac-spent-27-million-
supporting-obama-s-election-fec-filing-says; Kris Maher, SEIU Campaign Spending Pays Political 
Dividends, WALL STREET. J., May 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124243785248026055 
.html; SEIU Expected 2010 Political Expenditures, FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2010/08/service–employees–international–union–seiu/. See generally 
T. W. Farnam, Unions Outspending Corporations on Campaign Ads Despite Court Ruling, WASH. 
POST, July 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp–dyn/content/article/2010/07/06/AR20100 
70602133.html; Daniel Indiviglio, Despite Citizens United, Unions Outspend Corporations on Poli-
tics, THE ATLANTIC, July 7, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/despite–
citizens–united–unions–outspend–corporations–on–politics/59281/. 
 168. The political research focusing on the impact that union endorsements have on voter 
behavior has been somewhat mixed. See Monika L. McDermott, Not for Members Only: Group 
Endorsements as Electoral Information Cues, POL. RES. Q. 249, 250 (2006). But most of the re-
search has found a positive correlation between a union’s endorsement and its members’ voting 
behavior. See John Thomas Delaney et al., Union Membership and Voting for COPE-Endorsed 
Candidates, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 621, 630–35 (1990); Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, 
‘New-Style’ Judicial Campaigns and the Voters: Economic Issues and Union Membership in Ohio, 
W. POL. Q. 921, 923–24 (1992); Tom Juravich & Peter R. Shergold, The Impact of Unions on the 
Voting Behavior of Their Members, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 374, 381–85 (1988). But see Ronald 
B. Rapoport et al., Do Endorsements Matter? Group Influence in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses, 
AM. POL. SCI. REV.199–201 (1991). 
 169. The only time SEIU Healthcare 775NW’s collective-bargaining agreement has gone un-
funded was in 2003—the only year a request for funds was not included in the governor’s proposed 
budget. See Mot. for Accelerated Rev. at 4, SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d 774 (No. 82551–3) 
[hereinafter Mot. for Accelerated Rev.]; Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 2:30. 
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the budget.170 Even if the state were in a better financial position, the 
language used by the majority indicated that the governor may choose to 
disregard a statutorily mandated budget inclusion.171 Based on the major-
ity’s holding, whether experiencing a financial crisis or a budget surplus, 
Governor B would be able to exclude a request for funding a collective-
bargaining agreement.172 
C. The Court Exceeds Its Own Authority by Considering the 
Financial Position of the State 
The court exceeded its own authority by opining that even if man-
damus were appropriate, it would still refuse to issue the writ due to the 
state’s economic crisis.173 Although this statement was dictum, the deci-
sion indicated that the court would effectively rewrite this or any other 
statute in the future if the state were facing financial hardship.174 
Justice James M. Johnson was concerned about why SEIU mem-
bers should receive a pay raise, considering the difficult financial posi-
tion of the state.175 Although valid, Justice Johnson’s concern should not 
have superseded the law as written.176 Even if the legislature approved 
the award and the governor disagreed with it, the governor could use the 
line-item veto power to strike it from the budget.177 With a massive 
budget deficit facing the state, the legislature probably would not have 
approved such a request at the expense of other social services and pro-
grams.178 The legislature knew that there would be times when the col-
lective-bargaining awards would go unfunded or have to be renegotiated, 
                                                 
 170. SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 778 (“The inclusion of substantive spending items 
in the governor’s budget is clearly not a ministerial act . . . . [T]he allocation of funds for obligations 
in the governor’s budget necessarily requires a decision by the governor to remove funding from 
other priorities.”). 
 171. Id. (“The creation and submission of a budget proposal is clearly one of those discretio-
nary acts that are ‘in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to 
the executive,’ and inappropriate for mandamus.” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 170 (1803))). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 15:02. 
 176. See In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1976) (“Both history and 
uncontradicted authority make clear that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.’” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974))). 
 177. See Wash. State Leg. v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 885, 893 (Wash. 1997) (upholding the gover-
nor’s ability to veto certain budget provisions). 
 178. See Andrew Garber, State Lawmakers Reach Accord on $4 Billion in Cuts, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009105914_web 
budget22m.html (discussing the deep cuts made to public schools, higher education, health care, 
and various other state services). 
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and prescribed two ways of resolving the dispute if that were to hap-
pen.179 
Furthermore, the court made no reference to the constitutionality of 
the statute in its decision.180 Absent a finding that the statute was uncons-
titutional, it is the judiciary’s role to enforce the law as written.181 The 
court should not have made a judgment call on the likelihood of the leg-
islature funding the request if it was actually submitted by Governor 
Gregoire in her proposed budget.182 More importantly, however, the 
court should not have made a value judgment on the sensibleness of this 
specific budgetary inclusion183—that judgment is reserved for the legisla-
tive and executive branches to make between themselves.184 
D. Legal Purgatory 
As a consequence of this case, at least twelve statutes currently on 
the books are rendered potentially meaningless.185 While alluding to the 
fact that the creation and submission of the budget by the executive is a 
constitutional requirement,186 the majority did not explicitly hold that the 
statute was unconstitutional.187 Thus, by not issuing the writ of manda-
                                                 
 179. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.300(3) (2010) (“The legislature must approve or reject the 
submission of the request for funds as a whole. If the legislature rejects or fails to act on the submis-
sion, any such agreement will be reopened solely for the purpose of renegotiating the funds neces-
sary to implement the agreement.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.300(7) (2010) (allowing the 
governor or legislature to issue a proclamation to reopen the collective-bargaining agreements if the 
state experiences a dramatic revenue shortfall). 
 180. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 775−80 (Wash. 2010). 
 181. See In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1976) (“Both history and 
uncontradicted authority make clear that ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.’” (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703)). 
 182. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 781 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); Brown v. 
Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (Wash. 2009); Carrick v. Locke, 882 P.2d 173, 177 (Wash. 1994); In re 
Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 170−71 (“[C]ourts must limit their incursions into the legislative 
realm in deference to the separation of powers doctrine.”). 
 183. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 781 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (“We are not the 
legislature, and the court has no business upsetting the balance of powers between the executive and 
the legislative branches, no matter whether the members of this court think a particular budget item 
is wise or foolish.”). 
 184. See In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 170−71 (“[C]ourts must limit their incur-
sions into the legislative realm in deference to the separation of powers doctrine.”). 
 185. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.028(5), 41.56.029(5), 41.56.473(5); 41.56.510(6), 
41.80.010(3), 41.88.030(2)(b)–(c), 43.41.220(1), 43.88.060, 43.88.090(1), 47.64.170(9)(a), 
74.39A.300(1) (2010). 
 186. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 229 P.3d at 778 (“The creation and submission of the 
budget proposal is clearly one of those discretionary acts that are ‘in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and law, submitted to the executive . . . .’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803))). 
 187. See id. at 781 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (“Absent a showing that a statute is unconstitu-
tional (a showing that has not been made here) . . . .”). See also Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 
47:40. 
2012] When Must Means May 611 
mus, this decision puts all statutorily mandated budget requirements in a 
state of legal purgatory. The first group of effected statutes similarly 
deals with the funding of collective-bargaining agreements.188 In addition 
to the IPs affected in this case, the other statutes cover family childcare 
providers,189 adult family home providers,190 language access provid-
ers,191 Washington state patrol officers,192 employees of higher education 
institutions,193 and public marine employees.194 
The second group of potentially meaningless statutes concerns var-
ious administrative requirements the governor must follow when submit-
ting the proposed budget.195 The statutorily mandated requirements in-
clude the following: a deadline for the submission of the proposed budg-
et to the legislature,196 the estimated expenditures required by the judi-
ciary and legislative branches,197 and a deadline for terminating or trans-
ferring the duties of a board or commission.198 
The unfortunate result of this decision is that while the governor 
may choose to not follow any of the above statutes, any group of public 
employees subject to collective bargaining with the state is still required 
to follow the statutory requirements with regard to the collective-
bargaining process. Thus, employees that collectively bargain with the 
state are left at the whim of the legislature. The legislature still could 
fund the collective-bargaining agreement on its own, but this unilateral 
action is unlikely.199 Yet, when the governor includes the request in the 
                                                 
 188. § 41.56.028(5) (family childcare providers); § 41.56.029(5) (adult family home provid-
ers); § 41.56.473(5) (Washington state patrol officers); § 41.56.510(6) (language access providers); 
§ 41.80.010(3) (employees of institutions of higher education); § 47.64.170(9)(a) (public marine 
employees); § 74.39A.300(1) (long-term care providers). Half of the statutes use “must submit,” 
while half use “shall submit.” Despite the difference in word choice, the word “must” and “shall” are 
considered synonyms by the courts. See Buell v. City of Toppenish, 24 P.2d 431, 431 (Wash. 1933). 
And “shall” has been consistently held to create a mandatory duty. See Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 
911 P.2d 389, 392 (Wash. 1996); State v. Krall, 881 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Wash. 1994); Erection Co. v. 
Dep’t. of Labor & Indus., 852 P.2d 288, 289 (Wash. 1993). 
 189. § 41.56.028(5) (governor “must submit”). 
 190. Id. § 41.56.029(5) (governor “must submit”). 
 191. Id. § 41.56.510(6) (governor “must submit”). 
 192. Id. § 41.56.473(5) (governor “shall submit”). 
 193. Id. § 41.80.010(3) (governor “shall submit”). 
 194. Id. § 47.64.170(9)(a) (governor “shall submit”). 
 195. Id. §§ 41.88.030(2)(b)–(c), 43.41.220(1), 43.88.060, 43.88.090(1).  
 196. Id. § 43.88.060 (Governor “shall submit” the budget not later than December 20th in the 
year preceding the upcoming legislative session.). 
 197. Id. § 43.88.090(1) (“The estimates for the legislature and the judiciary shall be transmitted 
to the governor and shall be included in the budget without revision.”). 
 198. Id. § 43.41.220(1) (“The governor shall submit an executive request bill by January 8th of 
every odd-numbered year to implement the recommendations by expressly terminating the appropri-
ate boards and commissions and by providing for the transfer of duties and obligations . . . .”). 
 199. See Mot. for Accelerated Rev. at 4, supra note 169; Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 
2:30. 
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proposed budget, the odds of receiving funds improve dramatically.200 
The only time SEIU’s collective-bargaining agreement has gone un-
funded was in 2003—the only year a request for funds was not included 
in the governor’s proposed budget.201 
Further, a redrafting of the statute may not improve any union’s 
bargaining position. The legislature likely could not have phrased the 
statute in a way that the court would have agreed that the duty was man-
datory. At oral argument, Justice Sanders posed this very question to the 
State.202 The State completely avoided the question and responded to Jus-
tice Sanders by instead arguing that “must” should be construed as per-
missive to avoid reaching the constitutionality of the statute.203 This, 
however, is the State’s attempt to have it both ways: “must” is permis-
sive—allowing the governor to flout the statute in this instance—but the 
statute is not an unconstitutional usurpation of the governor’s powers, 
making the part of the statute at issue here superfluous because the gov-
ernor does not have to follow it. 
It remains to be seen if Governor Gregoire will ask the legislature 
to change the process by which collective-bargaining agreements are 
funded, or if the legislature will amend the statute to further clarify 
whether the request for funds is mandatory.204 Although the collective- 
bargaining statute was recently amended, the language at issue in this 
case was not modified.205 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in SEIU Health-
care 775NW v. Gregoire dramatically undermined the cornerstone of the 
balance of powers between the branches of government. This case was 
an example of a court simultaneously failing to give deference to a duly 
enacted statute, failing to check the power of the executive branch, and 
exceeding its own proper role. The Washington State Supreme Court 
should not have read “must” as “may.” 
                                                 
 200. See Mot. for Accelerated Rev. at 4, supra note 169; Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 
2:30. 
 201. See Mot. for Accelerated Rev. at 4, supra note 169; Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 
2:30. 
 202. Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 48:23. 
 203. Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 48:23. 
 204. S.B. 5349, proposed during the 2011 Legislative Session, would have done this very 
thing. The bill was titled, “Eliminating collective bargaining for state employees and certain other 
groups”; however, it failed to even make it out of committee after a single hearing. S.B. 5292, 62nd 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
 205. See Act of Apr. 2, 2010, ch. 296, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 5. 
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The Washington State Supreme Court erred in its analysis in three 
significant ways. First, it failed to give proper deference to the legislature 
by allowing Governor Gregoire to disregard a statutorily mandated and 
ministerial duty, even though the statute was not held to be an unconsti-
tutional usurpation of the governor’s powers. Second, the court put the 
enforceability of all statutorily mandated budget inclusions in serious 
doubt. Based on this holding, statutes using similar language to impose a 
duty on the governor to include specific spending measures in the pro-
posed budget are potentially meaningless because the mandatory lan-
guage was morphed into permissive language. The court’s decision gives 
undue deference to the executive’s discretion over the budgetary process. 
Third, the court, in dictum, said that even if it found the duty to be man-
datory and ministerial, it would refuse to issue the writ of mandamus be-
cause of the financial crisis. Such a refusal would have exceeded the 
court’s own power. Although an admirable goal, the judiciary does not 
have the power to make legislative or policy judgments on the soundness 
of certain budgetary measures. Policy judgments are the responsibility of 
the executive and legislative branches.206 
While unlikely, if a case presents itself in the future, the Washing-
ton State Supreme Court should seriously consider revisiting this issue 
and correcting its misguided analysis. The financial condition of the state 
may not improve for the foreseeable future, and it is likely that future 
governors will face similar situations.207 This case involved the delicate 
issue of the proper time for a court to intervene and check the power of 
another branch of government. Unfortunately, when the time was proper, 
the court did not do so. 
                                                 
 206. The division of the government into different branches has been presumed to give rise to a 
separation of powers doctrine. See SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 229 P.3d 774, 777−80 
(Wash. 2010); Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (Wash. 2009) (citing Carrick v. Locke, 882 P.2d 
173, 176−77 (Wash. 1994)). 
 207. The current projected budget shortfall for the 2011–2013 biennial budget is $4.6 billion. 
See Transforming Washington’s Budget, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.wa.gov/ 
priorities/budget/default.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
